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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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751

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MAY 5 1961

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 5, 1961

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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 18.

NSC-2

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MILITARY

Negative.

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. U.S.-Soviet Relations: As a result of the Cuban crisis, the Soviet press continues to present a more negative picture of US policy under President Kennedy's administration. Criticism of President Kennedy appeared more frequently and in sharper form, but was still restrained compared with previous attacks on former Presidents Eisenhower and Truman.

reiterated

Two authoritative "Observer" articles appeared in Pravda which charges of US responsibility for the "intervention," US intentions to resort to direct military intervention in Cuba, and criticism of the President personally. The Observer articles were supported by a steady flow of reprints and reports from the US press criticizing the Administration in connection with the "Cuban Adventure," and prominent reporting of statements by the Castro regime.

Another source of Soviet criticism against the US Administration has emerged in the Soviet press post mortem of the putsch in Algeria. The Soviet press continues to charge that the US and more particularly CIA were behind the French Generals in their effort. This charge is explained to the Soviet public as an effort by CIA to head-off agreement between the French and Algerian rebels which would result in the independence of Algeria and its subsequent loss as a base to NATO. Other alleged US motivations were ascribed to discontent with French NATO pretensions and desire for a more cooperative rightist regime. Pravda commented ironically that US complicity in the putsch is a promising prelude to the coming President-deGaulle meeting.

2. Laos. There was ominous silence in the Soviet press throughout much of the week on efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Laos. Before May Day, one newspaper editorial said the clouds were thickening over the Geneva Conference even before the foreign ministers sat down at the negotiating table as a result of the US establishment of a MAAG in Laos and preparations for direct US military intervention.

May Day speeches and special articles conspicuously omitted Laos in characterizing the current international situation and its implications for the world communist cause.

On April 30 the press reported that Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong announced that the failure of Boum Oum and Phoumi to send representatives to Xieng Khuang for talks indicated they did not want a ceasefire and the former said they would wait another 48 hours.

Despite this ultimatum, the Soviet press on May 4 announced that Souvanna Phouma had ordered a ceasefire effective May 3 and that details of an armistice agreement could be worked out by the combatants "at any place" in the neighborhood of Ban Na Mon. The Soviet press said nothing about the efforts of the Royal Laotian Government and other governments outside the communist bloc to bring about a ceasefire and has been completely silent on Sihanouk's withdrawal of his sponsorship of the 14-nation conference.

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3. May Day Celebration. Moscow's May Day celebration followed traditional lines with the center of attraction the Red Square parade and demonstration. Major Gagarin's presence beside Khrushchev on the reviewing stand and a number of floats in the parade testified to the heavy emphasis this year on Soviet space achievements. The military part of the parade did not reveal any new items of military equipment, and Marshal Malinovsky's speech, while critical of West Germany and the US and including the customary assertions of Soviet military strength, was not particularly noteworthy. Recent developments in Cuba cited in connection with the celebration to give point to the considerable volume of Soviet May Day propaganda on anti-colonialism and the national-liberation struggle. The presence of several delegations from African countries was also carefully exploited in press pictures and reporting to extract full value from the anti-colonial theme.

4. Visitors. The Soviet press on May 4 announced that space pilot Yuri Gagarin has been invited to attend the Aviation Exhibition in Paris May 27 by the "organizers of the exhibit." While the announcement did not state whether Gagarin would accept, the way in which the announcement was made indicates he is likely to go.

Indonesian Communist leader, D. N. Aidit arrived in Moscow in time for the May Day celebrations. During the parade Aidit was given a place of honor next to Khrushchev. Meanwhile Ruslan Abaulgani, Deputy Chairman of the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council is touring several cities in the USSR.

A Ghanaian military delegation headed by Brig. Gen. Ota arrived in Moscow on the invitation of Marshal Malinovsky.

The Brazilian Foreign Office delegation (see Weeka No. 17) was received by Khrushchev on May 3. Press coverage of the meeting reported Khrushchev as stressing the necessity for diplomatic relations in order to assist the expansion of trade between Brazil and the USSR.

A Bolivian Senate delegation headed by Senate President Ruben Castro arrived in Moscow as guests of the Supreme Soviet.

Cuban Minister of Education, Armando Hart Davalos, who arrived as the leader of a delegation of Cuban educators April 9, was reported in the Soviet press as among the guests at the May 1 parade at Red Square.

A Somali trade union delegation under Suber Epo Osman and Abdul Kader-Abuker Magdi also were reported in Moscow for the May Day festivities.

Danish scientist Niels Bohr arrived in Moscow May 3 as guest of the Soviet Academy of Science.

A delegation of UAR members of parliament led by Anwar Sadat arrived in Moscow April 28. The MP's have received red-carpet treatment including a publicized visit with Khrushchev May 3. UAR Embassy officers state that the visit is "a purely good-will mission."

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5. Leadership:
5. May Day brought Party First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev back from his Sochi vacation to stand on a tribunal with Soviet spaceman Yuri Gagarin for the second time in three weeks. The absence of Presidium member and CC Secretary F. R. Kozlov from May Day festivities went unexplained, but his portrait was prominently displayed close to Khrushchev's on 11 different May Day Presidium series posted around Moscow (see below). As a more frequent absentee from important leadership appearances the failure of aging CC Secretary O.V. Kuusinen (the only other Moscow resident Presidium figure absent from the May Day parade review in Red Square) to appear has not given rise to speculation.

Several protocol events publicized during the week partially illustrate the advantages to be reaped by the numerous overlapping functions and titles within the Soviet leadership. For example, an Indonesian CP delegation which arrived in Moscow on April 28 (the date of the Dutch National Holiday) was greeted by the non-Russian (Uzbek), Presidium member and CC Secretary N.A. Mukhitdinov for the "party." For the "government" RSFSR premier, CPSU Presidium member D. S. Polyanskiy (back from his two-week tour of the provinces) honored the Dutch with his presence at their reception. As a member of a predominantly Moslem national minority group, again it was Mukhitdinov who was chosen to meet a visiting UAR parliamentary delegation--utilizing this time his parliamentary title: "Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities." In the labor field, Presidium Candidate member V. V. Grishin, also both Chairman the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and Vice-President of the WFTU, arranged a reception on May 2, for foreign trade unionists visiting Moscow during the holidays.

Publication was announced during the week of a collection of Khrushchev's speeches on agriculture since the January plenum including speeches at regional meetings. This should help even further to engage Khrushchev's personal prestige in the current campaign to raise agricultural output.

6. More Detail on Uzbek CC Plenum which Shifted CC Secretary. Accounts of the April 24 Uzbek CP Central Committee plenum published in the regional Uzbekistan press elaborated on the abbreviated April 28 Pravda account (Pravda Vostoka, April 25). The plenum released M. A. Abdurazakov as a CC Secretary "in connection with this election as first secretary of the Tashkent Oblast Party Committee" and also (unannounced in Pravda) released R. G. Gulamov, who formerly held that Tashkent post, from the Uzbek CC bureau. M. M. Musakhanov, who has held various higher government and party jobs in Uzbekistan during the past few years, was coopted into the Uzbek CC and elected a Secretary and Bureau member.

During the major address of the plenum, Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov suggested strongly that Gulamov had been sacked in disgrace--and (with others) may face criminal action. He revealed that "recently the Uzbek Party CC uncovered a series of facts concerning irresponsible, criminal neglect of affairs by administrative functionaries in Tashkent--both party and government." These functionaries regardless of numerous signs and

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reliable indications available to them were said not to have undertaken measures for suppressing embezzlement of socialist property at the factory 'Metalloposuda'. Rashidov added ominously that the Republic prosecutor's office soon would complete its investigation and criminal charges would be made against these guilty. Apparently the Tashkent Oblast Party Committee (Obkom) already has held a plenum releasing Gulamov as first secretary, as Abdurazakov was identified by his new title at the CC plenum. As Tashkent Oblast First Secretary he will probably supervise any local "clean-up" campaign.

In addition to disclosing dishonesty in Tashkent, Rashidov complained of widespread corruption at lower levels in several other oblasts. "Many responsible workers in Surkhan-Darya" oblast "displaying private-property tendencies, occupied themselves with housebuilding, and several for the sake of personal enrichment embarked on the course of Kilkhoz extortion--abusing their official positions."

Rashidov also spoke of account padding in Kara-Kalpak ASSR and the removal from office of the long time Chairman of the Union of Consumers' Cooperatives there, Kh. Yu. Yunusov, for violating party principles in the selection of personnel (i.e., advanced his own cronies). Allegedly Yunusov compromised himself by appointing morally unstable and politically backward people to responsible positions.

According to available published summaries of other speeches at the plenum, 5 out of 6 oblast secretaries devoted considerable attention in their speeches to the central themes of "tightening control," "eliminating parasitic elements," "opportunists," "deception," "account padding," "white-washing," and the need for instilling personal devotion and honesty in personnel.

Kara-Kalpak ASSR First Secretary N. Makhmudov, whose publicized appearance and self-criticism at the plenum suggests that he has a chance of weathering this storm was frank enough to state that instilling honesty could be no short-term campaign. Surkhan-Darya Oblast First Secretary A. Khakimov and Bukhara Oblast First Secretary A. Rizayev (both last identified in Embassy records in Pravda Vostoka of February 15) were not mentioned as attending the plenum. Their oblasts had been criticized during the last few weeks for many of the above deficiencies.

7. May Day Leadership Portraits: Little specific can be deduced from the 11 CPSU CC Presidium portrait groups noted by Embassy officers around Moscow. None observed alphabetical order nor were any candidate members of the Presidium included. By protocol positioning of the 14 full members, N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev always led with F. R. Kozlov and A.I. Mikoyan usually third or fourth and M.A. Suslov and A.N. Kosygin most often in the fifth or sixth positions. A.B. Aristov and N.M. Shvernik most frequently occupied the lowest prestige positions. Portrait ranking of remaining Presidium members varied widely from grouping to grouping, averaging in the middle range. Several of the extremes worth noting are Kosygin's dropping

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to next to last in one instance, Suslov third once and 11th once, N. G. Ignatov's protocol range from 13th to 4th and Madame Furtseva from last to 7th. The order of leadership positioning on the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum tribune May 1 did little beyond indicating that Brezhnev, Suslov, Mikoyan and Kosygin continue to retain public recognition as among Khrushchev's closer and more ranking associates. (The presence of Old Bolshevik Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov on the tribune near Khrushchev is becoming a fairly standard feature, possibly to the chagrin or relief of that other Old Bolshevik used so often in the past to demonstrate historical continuity, Marshal S.M. Budennyi.)

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